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ARTICLES
Bowen v. Kendrick: Retreat from
Prophylaxis in Church-State
Relationships
[I]t is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be
relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The
breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too
soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, "It is
proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." 1
Introduction
In 1981, Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.) and Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah) introduced the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA),2 legislation
designed to counteract the perceived evils of the federal government's
major family planning program,3 Title X of the Public Health Service
Act of 1970.4 Certain members of Congress strongly objected to the fact
that Title X provided funding to programs, such as Planned Parenthood,
that offered abortion counseling; they also believed that by failing to re-
quire parental notification when adolescents received contraceptives
through Title X programs, the federal government was responsible for
creating barriers between adolescents and their families, to the detriment
of American family life.5 The supporters of the AFLA were convinced
1. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
2. 127 CONG. REC. 7895, 7953-54, 7968-74 (1981) (statement of Sen. Denton). The
AFLA was enacted as Title XX to the Public Health Services Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
578 (1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to 300z-10 (1982)). See infra notes 75-85 and accom-
panying text.
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1987, at A25, col.1 (report of interview in which Sen. Denton
stated that the AFLA was introduced to provide an alternative to Planned Parenthood); see
also Adolescents in Crisis: Parental Involvement: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Family
and Human Services of the Senate Commitee on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 201, 239 (1984) (statement of Sen. Denton) (The AFLA "was intended to correct an
already imposed immorality, which the government was paying for, and transmitting secretly,
through family planning grantees, to our children ....").
4. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572,
84 Stat. 1504 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a to 300a-8 (1982)).
5. In urging passage of the Adolescent Family Life Bill, Sen. Hatch recommended it as a
"family-centered solution" to the problems caused by adolescent sexual activity, in contrast to
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that Title X was not the solution to the problem of teenage pregnancy,
and that the easy availability of contraceptives and information about
abortion was one of the major causes of the increase in sexual activity
among American teenagers and the corresponding increase in the adoles-
cent pregnancy rate.6
The AFLA provided grants to public agencies and private organiza-
tions to develop programs to provide assistance to adolescent parents and
pregnant adolescents.7 It incorporated most of the features of its prede-
cessor, the Adolescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and
Care Act of 1978,8 but deviated from it in adding new components aimed
at preventing premarital sex among teenagers, and at encouraging preg-
nant adolescents to choose adoption over abortion.9 The AFLA also
required parental notification as a condition to the provision of services,'0
and required the involvement and participation of religious organizations
in its programs.1
In 1983, the constitutionality of the AFLA was challenged on the
ground that the use of federal funds by religious groups to counsel ado-
lescents in matters concerning sexual morality violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.' 2 The United States Supreme Court, in
the Title X approach, which "emphasizes the biology of sex, and contraceptive technology
... ," an approach that "encourag[es] federally-funded agencies to intervene between parents
and their children." 127 CONG. REC. 8266 (1981) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Cf. Oversight on
Family Planning Programs Under Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 1984: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Family and Human Services of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1984) (statement of Sen. Helms) ("[T]itle X
tends to create an atmosphere in which teenage promiscuity is viewed as normal and accepta-
ble conduct .... [I]t repudiates parental rights, familiar responsibility, and traditional moral-
ity."); 132 CONG. REC. S17196-98 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (Statement of Sen. Humphrey)
("[T]itle X... outrages parents, disrupts neighborhoods, and threatens to invade schools....
[It] has come to mean ... publicly subsidized family planning services.., for promiscuous
children of affluent families .. "); 134 CONG. REC. S9788-91 (daily ed. July 25, 1988) (state-
ment of Sen. Helms) ("1 1/2 billion in the hands of terrorists could not have inflicted the long-
term harm to our society that Title X expenditures have done.... American ... tax dollars are
being used by Planned Parenthood and the abortion industry in this Nation to subsidize abor-
tion-related activities ... [and] to provide free contraceptives to minors ... without parental
consent .... ").
6. See 127 CONG. REC. 8266 (1981) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Forum for Fami-
lies: Quality of American Family Life: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Family and
Human Services of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. 39-50 (1984) (statement of Sen. Denton) ("The thrust of some programs is to motivate
the minor to become sexually involved by giving prescription birth control drugs and devices
in order to participate in sexual activity.").
7. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
8. Titles VI, VII, and VIII of the Health Services and Centers Amendments, Pub. L. No.
95-626, 92 Stat. 3595-3601 (1978); see infra note 75.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z(b)(1) and 300z(b)(2).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(22)(A)(i).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z(a)(10)(C), 300z-2, and 300z-5(a)(21)(B); see infra note 156.
12. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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Bowen v. Kendrick, 3 found the AFLA "facially neutral," and thus con-
stitutional, in that it provided for the disbursement of funds to a broad
spectrum of grantees, fewer than fifty percent of which were religious
groups.'4 The Court remanded the case with instructions to the lower
court to fashion a remedy for the admitted constitutional violations that
had occurred in the administration of the statute.' 5
The standard that has guided the Court in its establishment clause
rulings since 1971 is the three-part "Lemon test," first articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 6 Simply stated, the Lemon test requires that a
challenged statute have both a secular purpose and a secular effect, and
that its implementation create no entanglement between church and
state.' 7 This Comment argues that the Supreme Court, by examining
only the facial validity of the AFLA,'5 and refusing to consider the risk
of impermissible effect or to factor the "as-applied" violations into its
analysis,' 9 has severely curtailed the "effect" prong of the three-part test,
and has diminished the Lemon test's value as a delineator of impermissi-
ble government support of religion. In addition, the Court has sent a
message that publicly funded instruction of children in religiously sensi-
tive subjects has become "neutral," 2 and hence permissible under first
amendment establishment clause analysis, when the instruction is ap-
proved by Congress and when the subjects reflect "traditional moral-
ity." In so doing, the Court has indicated the possibility of a new
toleration of direct government funding of religious schools.
Part I of this Comment discusses the Establishment Clause and the
three-part Lemon test. Part II describes the Adolescent Family Life Act
and sets out the background and holding of Bowen v. Kendrick. Part III
analyzes the Supreme Court's ruling, and argues that the Court should
have found the AFLA invalid under all three prongs of the Lemon test.
The Comment concludes that while the Lemon test has not been specifi-
cally overruled, the Court now contains a majority for reinterpreting the
Court's previous rulings in favor of a new support for government fund-
ing of parochial education, and perhaps even for overturning the entire
test.
13. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
14. Id. at 2575 & n.7.
15. Id. at 2580.
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
17. For a discussion of the Lemon test, see infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 109-119 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 190-214 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
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I. The Establishment Clause And The Lemon Test
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . -.22 Because the
purpose of this provision "was to state an objective, not to write a stat-
ute,"'23 the courts have had to struggle with the task of "developing rules
and principles to realize the goal of the religion clauses without freezing
them into an overly rigid mold." 24
Realizing that strict separation of church and state is impossible as a
practical matter,25 the Court has not barred all aid to religion.26 It has,
instead, "attempted to devise a formula that would help identify the kind
and degree of aid that is permitted and forbidden by the Establishment
Clause."' 27 The Court has abandoned the principle of the absolute "wall
of separation" between church and state,28 and has identified "neutral-
ity" as the state's primary objective. 29 "The State must confine itself to
secular objectives and neither advance nor impede religious activity." 30
Most of the Supreme Court's establishment clause decisions fall into
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I (the Religion Clauses, or the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause).
23. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
24. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1155-56 (2d ed. 1988).
25. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976); see Beschle, The Con-
servative as Liberal The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice
O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 171-73 (1987) (arguing that absolute separation is
impossible to maintain in the late twentieth century).
26. For example, the Court has permitted the state to provide transportation for children
to and from school, whether public or private. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
It has also allowed the state to loan secular textbooks to students attending both public and
parochial schools. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
27. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 821 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting).
28. The concept of the "wall of separation" was borrowed from the writings of Thomas
Jefferson, and was first articulated as a constitutional standard in Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
29. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 747; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 792-93; School Dist. of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).For a discussion of some of the complexities of the
neutrality principle, see L. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 1188-1201. Not all constitutional scholars
agree that neutrality is either a working or a workable objective. See, e.g., Valauri, The Con-
cept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITr. L. REV. 83, 86 (1986) (argu-
ing that Everson effectively created two incompatible conceptions of establishment clause
neutrality: "a separationist conception prohibiting aid to religion, and an accomodationist
conception allowing religious participation in secular governmental programs of general social
benefit"); M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 249-52 (1988) (arguing that strict neutrality would prohibit the state from ac-
commodating the free exercise rights of religious believers).
30. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 747; see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
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one of three main categories.31 First, in the cases involving government
practices and regulations, the Court has used custom and historical pre-
cedent to justify such practices as Sunday closing laws, the use of legisla-
tive chaplains, and the display of religious symbols on public property.32
In other cases, the Court has held unconstitutional legislation that re-
quires a religious test as part of the qualification for holding public of-
fice. 3 Second, in the "general welfare services" cases, the Court has
ruled that public funds may be used to provide bus transportation, school
lunches, and secular textbooks to religiously affiliated schools. 34 The
third category, the religion in education cases, can be further divided into
two groups. In the first subgroup, the Court has consistently invalidated
statutes that require religious activities (prayers, Bible reading, posting of
the Ten Commandments) in public schools, or that prohibit the teaching
of the theory of evolution or require equal treatment of evolution and
"creation science" in public school science classes. In the second sub-
group, the cases involving public aid to sectarian educational institutions,
the Court's decisions have been less predictable, and are less easy to cate-
gorize. In general, the Court has allowed public grants to religiously
affiliated colleges and universities, when the funds are used entirely for
secular purposes and there are statutory restrictions on the use of the
funds.36 The Court has generally disallowed direct grants or the furnish-
ing of equipment (other than textbooks) or on-campus therapeutic serv-
ices to "pervasively sectarian" elementary and secondary schools.3 7
31. For a more comprehensive survey of the Court's establishment clause jurisprudence,
see Note, Bowen v. Kendrick: Establishing a New Relationship Between Church and State, 38
AM. U.L. REV. 953, 958-74 (1989).
32. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (display of Christmas creche on municipal
property); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (maintenance of legislative chaplains);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws). For a general discussion
of these "de facto" establishments of religion, see Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18
CONN. L. REV. 701, 725-29 (1986) (citing M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS
11 (1965)).
33. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
34. Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (bus transportation); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(loan of secular textbooks); see Pickrell & Horwich, "Religion as an Engine of Civil Policy'" A
Comment on the First Amendment Limitations on the Church-State Partnership in the Social
Welfare Field, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at 111, 117.
35. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (requirement of equal treatment of
evolution and "creation science"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting of Ten Com-
mandments); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (prohibition against teaching of evolu-
tion); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible study);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayers).
36. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). These are referred to infra as the "college
cases"; see note 137 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 213.
37. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973). The only exception to date is Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S.
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In interpreting the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court devel-
oped a three-part standard: A challenged statute or government regula-
tion must have a secular legislative purpose,3s its primary effect must be
neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion, 39 and the imple-
mentation of the statute must create no excessive entanglement between
religion and the state.4° This standard has come to be known as the
"Lemon test," after the 1971 case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 in which the
Court first consolidated the three parts into one general ruling.
In a case decided the same day as Lemon, the Court stated that the
three prongs of the test should not be viewed as mathematically precise
absolutes, but rather as "guidelines with which to identify instances in
which the objectives of the Religion Clauses have been impaired."42 The
Court has stressed its unwillingness to be "confined to any single test or
criterion in this sensitive area,"'4 3 but also repeatedly has affirmed that
government action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause "should
be measured against the Lemon criteria."" In addition, the Court has
treated each of the prongs of Lemon independently, as absolute determi-
nators, rather than as competing interests to be evaluated in a balancing
test.4 All three prongs must be met or a law will be struck down. For
example, since the purpose prong of the Lemon test requires only that
the legislation have a valid secular purpose (and not that the purpose be
646 (1980), in which the Court upheld reimbursement for secular services required by state
law. For a discussion of the characteristics that distinguish a pervasively sectarian institution,
see infra text accompanying notes 196-198.
38. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449-50 (1961) (holding that Maryland's Sun-
day closing laws had the valid purpose of establishing a common day of rest); Everson, 330
U.S. at 6-7 (holding that the state of New Jersey had a valid secular purpose in providing free
bus transportation to children attending parochial school).
39. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (allowing the loan of free non-
religious textbooks to parochial school students); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (holding unconsti-
tutional a Pennsylvania law that required the reading of a portion of the Bible in public schools
at the beginning of each school day).
40. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (holding that general tax exemptions
for religious property did not violate the Establishment Clause because the administrative en-
tanglements were not excessive).
41. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a more complete discussion of Lemon and the three-part
test, see L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 130-31 (1986).
42. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); see also Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 n.31
(1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); cf. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741
(1973) (three prongs are "signposts").
43. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
44. Ball, 473 U.S. at 383.
45. Aid that the Court has classified as endorsing or advancing religion will be struck
down, even though it may serve important government interests. Developments in the Law,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1678-79 (1987) (contrasting the Court's approach in establishment
clause cases with its use of the balancing test in its decisions under the Free Exercise Clause).
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completely secular),4 6 the Court usually determines that the purpose
prong has not been violated.47 But the challenged statute will still be
found unconstitutional if the Court determines that it impermissibly ad-
vances religion, or that it creates excessive entanglement.48
The results of the Court's efforts to interpret the Establishment
Clause have not been entirely satisfactory.4 9
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution
.... The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the
court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweep-
ing utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in rela-
tion to particular cases but have limited meaning as general
principles.5 °
Of the Justices presently seated on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia had, prior to Bowen
v. Kendrick, unequivocally declared their dissatisfaction with all or part
of the Lemon test and with many of the Court's rulings under the three-
part test, particularly with the rulings in the aid to religious education
cases.
5 1
46. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680; Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2570 (1988).
47. See infra note 153.
48. "The propriety of a legislature's purposes may not immunize from further scrutiny a
law which either has a primary effect that advances religion, or which fosters excessive entan-
glements between Church and State." Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
774 (1973).
49. See, eg., Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses,
41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 309 (1989) (arguing that the Lemon test's "sharp dichotomies (secu-
lar/religious, advance/not advance, excessive/acceptable entanglement) appear too rigid to do
justice to the complex nature of modem church-state interaction, especially given the vast
expansion in the range of government activities since the New Deal").
50. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970); see also infra notes 52-73 and accom-
panying text. For comments on the Supreme Court's "inconsistent adjudications" of establish-
ment clause cases, see Beschle, supra note 25, at 163-64 (observing that the "imprecision" of
the Court's terminology in its establishment clause cases has drawn heavy criticism); The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 155-56 (1983) (contending that "the
Court's past interpretation of the Lemon test has suffered from considerable internal contradic-
tion"); Note, Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball and Aguilar v. Felton: Confusion in Applying
Lemon v. Kurtzman's Effects and Entanglement Tests, 50 ALB. L. REV. 811, 815-22 (1986)
(arguing that the "confusing semantics" used by the Lemon Court in setting forth the entan-
glement prong obscured the fact that "excessive entanglement" was, at its outset (in Walz),
"merely one manifestation of an impermissible effect"); Choper, The Establishment Clause and
Aid to Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 5, 6-7 (1987) (contending that deci-
sions since Lemon "have produced a conceptual disaster area"); L. LEVY, supra note 41, at
136-64 (arguing that the Court has been erratic and unprincipled in its establishment clause
decisions); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2605 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. As noted, infra note 103, the Bowen v. Kendrick majority consisted of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Kennedy added a con-
curring opinion, his first judicial statement in an establishment clause case. See infra text
accompanying notes 129-130. Subsequently, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the majority opinion in
Bowen v. Kendrick, has been the Court's most outspoken opponent of the
Lemon test. He believes that "[tihe three-part test has simply not pro-
vided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases
.*."..52 He has argued that the purpose and effect tests articulated in
Lemon emerged from a mistaken understanding of constitutional his-
tory, 53 and that the courts have mistakenly transformed the original in-
tent of the Establishment Clause that Congress shall be neutral regarding
competing religious views into a notion of neutrality between religion
and irreligion. 4
3086 (1989), a case involving the constitutionality of two holiday displays, one containing a
creche and the other consisting of a Hanukkah menorah, Kennedy wrote a lengthy opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Scalia. Kennedy began with a seeming attempt to deprecate the Lemon test's primacy as a
constitutional standard: "In keeping with the usual fashion of recent years, the majority applies
the Lemon test to judge the constitutionality of the holiday displays here in question." Id. at
3134 (emphasis added). He added that although he was "content for present purposes to re-
main within the Lemon framework," he did not "wish to be seen as advocating, let alone
adopting, that test as [the] primary guide in this difficult area." Id. He stopped short of actu-
ally finding fault with the Court's previous establishment clause rulings, however, observing
only that "[p]ersuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged." Id. (citations omitted). Kennedy
stated that the Court is bound by the precedent of its previous rulings, id. at 3134, but ex-
pressed a view that more closely matches Chief Justice Rehnquist's philosophy, see infra note
53, than it does the Court's prior decisions. Kennedy claimed that the Court's establishment
clause cases have disclosed two limiting principles:
[G]ovemment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion
or religious faith, or tends to do so."
Id. at 3136 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). But cf Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
786 (proof of coercion not a necessary element of any establishment clause claim); id at 771
(law need not promote a state religion to qualify as establishment of religion).
52. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
53. In a lengthy dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 91-144 (decision striking down
an Alabama law authorizing a moment of silence in public schools, to be used for meditation
or silent prayer), Justice Rehnquist analyzed the history of the Religion Clauses, and adopted
the originalist view developed by scholars such as R. Cord in SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982), and W. Berns in THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976). This version of history
proposes that the Framers never intended to build the "wall of separation" between govern-
ment and religion that was constitutionalized in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16
(1947), see supra note 28, but rather wanted simply to prevent the state from establishing a
preferred religion or a national church. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 98 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). "The 'wall of separation between Church and State' is a metaphor based on bad
history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and
explicitly abandoned." Id. at 106-07.
54. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 395 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Nomination of Justice William
Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1986) (testimony of Justice Rehnquist).
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Justice White dissented from Lemon v. Kurtzman,55 and has main-
tained a consistent position56 through the seventeen years separating
Lemon and Bowen v. Kendrick, particularly with regard to the Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause in the context of public aid to
private schools. 7 Two years after Lemon was decided, White an-
nounced, "I am quite unreconciled to the Court's decision in Lemon....
I thought then, and I think now, that the Court's conclusion there was
not required by the First Amendment and is contrary to the long-range
interests of the country."58
Both Rehnquist and White have argued that the entanglement test
creates an "insoluble paradox" in certain cases, 59 particularly those in-
volving government aid to sectarian schools.60 Justice O'Connor has also
argued for the abandonment of the entanglement prong, at least as a
standard separate from the effect analysis.61 She has theorized that the
"anomalous results"62 in many of the Court's establishment clause cases
are " 'attributable to [the] "entanglement" prong,' "63 and would not in-
55. 403 U.S. 602, 663.
56. The three-fold test of Lemon ... imposes unnecessary, and ... superfluous tests
for establishing "when the state's involvement with religion passes the peril point"
for First Amendment purposes.... As long as there is a secular legislative purpose,
and as long as the primary effect of the legislation is neither to advance nor inhibit
religion, I see no reason ... to take the constitutional inquiry any further.
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1975) (White, J., concurring) (citing
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)); see
also Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 490 (1986) (White, J.,
concurring); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (White, J., dissenting).
58. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 820 (White, J., dissenting).
59. The theory that the entanglement test creates an "insoluble paradox" was originally
proposed by Justice White in his dissent in Lemon, where he claimed that under the Lemon
standards, "the State cannot finance secular instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the
same classroom; but if it exacts a promise that religion not be so taught... and enforces it, it is
then entangled in the 'no entanglement' aspect of the Court's Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 666-68; see also Roemer, 426 U.S. at 768-69 (White, J., concur-
ring). In Aguilar v. Felton, Rehnquist accused the Court of having
take[n] advantage of the "Catch-22" paradox of its own creation ... whereby aid
must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to
cause an entanglement .... [W]e have indeed traveled far afield from the concerns
which prompted the adoption of the First Amendment when we rely on gossamer
abstractions to invalidate a law which obviously meets an entirely secular need.
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420-21 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. at 422-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. For example, we permit a State to pay for bus transportation to a parochial
school, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), but preclude States from
providing buses for parochial school field trips, on the theory that such trips involve
excessive state supervision of the parochial officials who lead them. Wolman, 433
U.S. at 254.
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. at 430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. at 430 (quoting Choper, The Religious Clauses of the First
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prr-. L. REV. 673, 681 (1980)).
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validate a statute that lacked a purpose or effect of advancing religion
"merely because it requires some ongoing cooperation between church
and state or some state supervision to ensure that state funds do not ad-
vance religion." 64
O'Connor has also proposed a reformulation of the purpose and ef-
fect tests, suggesting that the proper inquiry under the purpose prong
should be "whether the government intends to convey a message of en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion,"'65 and that the effect prong should
be interpreted to require that "a government practice not have the effect
of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval
of religion." 66
Justice Scalia,67 a strong believer in judicial restraint, has criticized
the Court for being too "active." 68 He has suggested that legislatures
enact vague and unclear legislation for political reasons, and argued that
the courts have no business taking over the legislative function just be-
cause legislators lack the "political stomach" to do the job properly.69
For this reason, Scalia is particularly opposed to the use of the purpose
prong of the three-part Lemon test.70 He has not condemned the entire
Lemon test outright, but has stated that he finds the Court's establish-
ment clause jurisprudence "embarrassing, "71 and utterly confusing, "no-
toriously unclear," and "contradictory. '72 He has characterized the
64. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. at 430.
65. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. at 422 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Loewy, Rethinking
Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Po-
tential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1049, 1050-52 (1986). Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy do not seem favorably disposed towards
Justice O'Connor's "no endorsement" test. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct.
890, 907 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.); County of
Allegheny v ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3134 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Rehn-
quist, C.J., White, J., and Scalia, J.).
67. Prior to Bowen v. Kendrick, Scalia had written only one establishment clause opinion,
the dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
68. Scalia, The Judges are Coming, reprinted in 126 CONG. REc. 18920, 18922 (1980).
69. See Note, The Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia: What the Future Holds for
Church and State, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 380, 385-87 (1988) and cases cited therein.
70. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. at 2607. Scalia doubts whether the "purpose" prong
is a proper interpretation of the Constitution. Id. at 2593. In addition, he has argued that
while "legislative purpose" in the context of the Lemon test means "the 'actual' motives of
those responsible for the challenged action," id., "discerning the subjective motivation of those
enacting the statute is ... almost always an impossible task," id. at 2605. He would therefore
accept as valid a "sincere" secular purpose, regardless whether that purpose is likely to be
achieved by the challenged legislation. Id. at 2593.
71. Id. at 2607.
72. Tuition Tax Relief Bills: Hearing on S. 96, S. 311, S. 834, S. 954, S. 1570, S. 1781, S.
2142 Before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate
Committee on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 295-97 (1978) [hereinafter Tuition Tax Hearing]
(statement of Antonin Scalia).
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three-part test as less a tool of analysis than a convenient basis "for ratio-
nalizing results reached in some other fashion," an elastic abstraction
that can be "applied strictly or liberally . . . in order to support the
outcome.
73
Despite such negative attitudes on the part of the individual Justices
toward the Lemon test and its application in past cases, however, the
Court has never contained a majority for overruling Lemon, and has
maintained the three-part test as the appropriate standard for ascertain-
ing the limits of permissible government accomodation of religion.74 In
ruling on the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act, the
Court in Bowen v. Kendrick again followed the Lemon analysis, but in a
way that calls into question its future ability to articulate the boundaries
of behavior foreclosed by the Establishment Clause.
II. Facts and Procedural History of Bowen v. Kendrick
A. The Adolescent Family Life Act
In 1981, Congress enacted the Adolescent Family Life Act75 in re-
sponse to the "severe adverse health, social, and economic consequences"
that often follow pregnancy and childbirth among unmarried adoles-
cents.76 The AFLA provides grants to organizations to set up demon-
stration projects providing two basic kinds of services: "care services,"
which include "necessary services for the provision of care to pregnant
adolescent parents and adolescent parents,"' 77 and "prevention services,"
73. Tuition Tax Hearing, supra note 72, at 296-97.
74. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to 300z-10 (1982). Both the AFLA and its predecessor, the Ado-
lescent Health Services and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act of 1978, see supra note 8 and
accompanying text, were enacted to provide grants to public agencies and non-profit private
organizations for programs that provide services to adolescent parents and pregnant adoles-
cents. The "prevention" component of the 1978 Act focused on the prevention of pregnancy,
in contrast to the AFLA's emphasis on the prevention of adolescent premarital sexual activity.
For a discussion of the differences between the AFLA and the 1978 Act, see Mecklenburg &
Thompson, The Adolescent Family Life Program as a Prevention Measure, 98 PUBLIC HEALTH
REPORTS, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 25-27, reprinted in Pregnancy-Related Health Services: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 80-88 (1985).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(5). The enactment of the AFLA was also motivated by Congress'
perception that "the Federal Government has a responsibility to help states develop adequate
approaches to the serious and increasing problems of adolescent premarital sexual relations
and pregnancy." S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981). For a lucid and comprehen-
sive discussion of the political background of the enactment of the AFLA and its predecessor
program, see M. VINOVSKIS, AN "EPIDEMIC" OF ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY?-SOME HIs-
TORICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 76-86 (1988).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-l(a)(7). These services include pregnancy testing, maternity coun-
seling, adoption counseling and referral services, primary and preventive health services in-
cluding prenatal and postnatal care, nutrition information and counseling, referral to
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or "necessary services to prevent adolescent sexual relations.""8 Most of
the "necessary services" enumerated in the AFLA involve some form of
teaching, counseling, or referral.
The AFLA has, among its stated purposes, "to find effective means,
within the context of the family, of reaching adolescents before they be-
come sexually active in order to ... promote self-discipline and other
prudent approaches to the problem of adolescent premarital sexual rela-
tions..."79 and to promote adoption as an alternative to abortion. 0 The
AFLA provides that since "the problems of adolescent premarital sexual
relations, pregnancy, and parenthood are multiple and complex,"' 8' such
problems are "best approached through a variety of integrated and essen-
tial services provided to adolescents and their families by other family
members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary organiza-
tions, and other groups in the private sector."82 The AFLA therefore
provides that applications for grants "shall include ... a description of
how the applicant will, as appropriate in the provision of services...
involve religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations,
and other groups in the private sector ....
The only statutory restrictions on the use of AFLA funds state that
none of the AFLA grants may be used for projects that provide abortions
or that involve abortion counseling, and that grants may be made only to
projects or programs that do not promote, advocate or encourage abor-
tion.84 In addition, AFLA funds may not be used for the provision of
family planning services if such services are available elsewhere "in the
community., 85
B. The Facts and Holding of Bowen v. Kendrick
In 1983, plaintiffs (including federal taxpayers, four Protestant min-
isters, and the American Jewish Congress) filed suit in the United States
District Court in Washington, D.C., challenging the constitutionality of
appropriate pediatric care, referral to maternity home services and mental health services,
childcare sufficient to enable the adolescent parent to continue education, consumer education
and homemaking, and transportation. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-l(a)(4).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-l(a)(8). These services include referral for screening and treatment
of venereal disease; and educational services relating to family life and problems associated
with adolescent premarital sexual relations, including information on adoption, education on
the responsibilities of sexuality and parenting, and assistance to parents, schools, youth agen-
cies, and health providers to educate adolescents and preadolescents concerning self-discipline
and responsibility in human sexuality. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-l(a)(4).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-l(b)(1).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(b)(2); see also S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(8)(A).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(8)(B).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10(a); see infra note 239 and accompanying text.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-3(b)(1).
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the AFLA on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. 6 The plaintiffs contended that Congress had enacted
the AFLA with the purpose of promoting a religious solution to the teen-
age pregnancy problem.87 The plaintiffs also argued that the federal gov-
ernment, through the Department of Health and Human Services, had
endorsed religion in the implementation of the AFLA by injecting reli-
gious bias in the grant-making process, 88 by condoning the advancement
of religion in AFLA programs, 89 and by supporting religious institutions
that promote religious tenets.90 The plaintiffs further contended that the
AFLA had the direct effect of advancing religion because it channeled
tax revenues to religious organizations for the specific purpose of teach-
ing young children and teenagers about subjects laden with religious and
moral content.9 ' Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the AFLA fostered
excessive entanglement between government and religion because the
surveillance required to prevent government funding of the teaching of
religion in AFLA programs would create an impermissible degree of en-
tanglement between church and state.92
In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
"carefully and exhaustively consider[ed] the motions, the statements of
material facts not in dispute, the allegations of undisputed facts, the gol-
conda of documents submitted to the Court, and the case law,"9' and
found that the AFLA was unconstitutional on its face and as applied
86. Appellees' and Cross-Appellants' Brief at 5, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562
(1988) (Nos. 87-253, 87-431, 87-462, 87-775).
87. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 32-34, Kendrick v. Heckler, 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987) (No. 83-
3175) (later Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2562
(1988)) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment].
88. In a lengthy description of the grant review and awards process, the plaintiffs detailed
the way in which the Director of the Office of Adolescent Pregnancy Programs (of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services) selected, as readers (evaluators) of the grant applications,
persons who were either employed by religious organizations, such as Catholic Charities, or
affiliated with religious groups that had strong anti-abortion theologies. Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 87, at 35-37. The plaintiffs also described incidents illustrat-
ing the grant readers' bias against projects that did not emphasize moral values and "spiritual
development," or that did not take a sufficiently emphatic anti-abortion position. Id. at 37-44.
89. The plaintiffs cited specific instances of AFLA grantees using AFLA funds to teach
sex education in parochial schools, using religious curricula. Id. at 44-46.
90. The plaintiffs listed numerous AFLA-funded programs run by religious hospitals, ma-
ternity homes, and social service agencies, wholly owned and controlled by various Christian
churches. The plaintiffs described the ways in which AFLA funds enabled religious institu-
tions to expand pre-existing services, thereby promoting their religious philosophies concern-
ing human sexuality and family planning. AFLA funds were also used to pay the salaries of
religious personnel in a number of programs. Id. at 48-68.
91. Id. at 69-77.
92. Id. at 78-81.
93. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1554 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2562
(1988).
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insofar as religious organizations were involved in carrying out the pro-
grams and purposes of the Act. 94
The district court explained that while the distinction between an
establishment clause challenge to a statute "on its face" and a challenge
to the statute "as applied" had not been clearly delineated by the
Supreme Court, establishment clause precedents required the court first
to consider the possible applications of a particular statute, and then to
analyze the statute's actual applications; if the application was the only
constitutionally offensive element, the court would nonetheless be re-
quired to strike the statute down on its face.95 The court applied the
three-part Lemon test and found that the AFLA was not motivated
wholly by religious considerations, and that it had a valid secular pur-
pose.96 Nevertheless, the court held that the Act was unconstitutional
both on its face and as applied.
The court first determined that the AFLA was facially invalid be-
cause it had a direct effect of advancing religion, in that it funded the
teaching and counseling of adolescents by religious organizations on mat-
ters relating to religious doctrine.97 The court then cited representative
portions of the record (rather than engaging in an "exhaustive recita-
tion" of the undisputed facts)98 and held that the AFLA was unconstitu-
tional as applied because the record revealed that the Act had directly
"advanced religion, [h]ad funded 'pervasively sectarian' institutions, [and
had] permitt[ed] the use of federal tax dollars for education and counsel-
ing that amount[ed] to the teaching of religion."99 Finally, the court
ruled that because many of the organizations funded by the AFLA had a
religious character and purpose, "the risk that AFLA funds will be used
to transmit religious doctrine can be overcome only by government mon-
itoring so continuous that it rises to the level of excessive entangle-
ment."" The court ordered that the government be enjoined from
funding any religious organizations under the AFLA.10
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) appealed
the district court's decision to the United States Supreme Court,'02 which
held, in a five-to-four ruling,103 that the AFLA was not invalid on its face
because, first, it was motivated primarily by a valid secular purpose: "the
94. Id. at 1551.
95. Id. at 1552.
96. Id. at 1558-60.
97. Id. at 1562-64.
98. Id. at 1564.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1567.
101. Id. at 1570.
102. The appeal was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Brief for the Appellant, Otis
R. Bowen at 12, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (Nos. 87-253, 87-431, 87-462).
103. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the major-
ity opinion, joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor
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elimination or reduction of social and economic problems caused by
teenage sexuality, pregnancy and parenthood."'"
The Court asserted that Congress' inclusion of "religious organiza-
tions" in the AFLA reflected a legitimate secular goal: "the entirely ap-
propriate aim of increasing broad-based community involvement in
'helping adolescent boys and girls understand the implications of premar-
ital sexual relations, pregnancy and parenthood.' "101 The Court noted
that the legislative history showed that Congress approved of the fact
that religious groups had been grantees of the AFLA's predecessor pro-
gram, and intended to acknowledge the role that religious organizations
can play in helping solve the problems to which the AFLA is ad-
dressed. 106 The Court refused to accept the premise that Congress' inclu-
sion of religious groups signified an impermissible purpose "simply
because some of the goals of the statute coincide with the beliefs of cer-
tain religious organizations." 107 The majority contended that the serv-
ices provided under the AFLA were "not religious in character," that
there was "nothing inherently religious about these activities," and that
the AFLA's "particular approach toward dealing with adolescent sexual-
ity and pregnancy ... is not inherently religious .... "10
Second, the Court found that the AFLA did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion, since it was a "facially neutral" statute that
provided for a broad-based distribution of grant funds, and since nothing
on the face of the statute indicated that a significant portion of the federal
funds would be disbursed to "pervasively sectarian" institutions.10 9
The Court identified the two ways in which it claimed that the
AFLA, considered on its face, could theoretically be found to have the
primary effect of advancing religion. First, by expressly "recognizing
that 'religious organizations have a role to play' in addressing the
problems associated with teenage sexuality,"' 10 the AFLA could be said
to endorse religious solutions to the problems addressed by the Act, and
to create a symbolic link between religious organizations and the govern-
wrote a concurring opinion, as did Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia. Justice Black-
mun wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
104. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2571.
105. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 15-16 (1981)).
106. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2572 n.9.
107. Id. at 2571 n.8 (referring to Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (upholding
the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds for
abortions); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (upholding Maryland's Sunday
closing laws against establishment clause challenge)).
108. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2572.
109. Id. at 2575. The Bowen v. Kendrick majority did not define "pervasively sectarian."
For a discussion of the use of this term in earlier cases, see infra text accompanying notes 190-
202.
110. Id. at 2572 (quoting S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1981)).
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ment."' Second, by allowing religiously affiliated organizations to par-
ticipate as grantees or sub-grantees in the AFLA programs, the AFLA
could be viewed as authorizing the "impermissible 'inculcation' of reli-
gious beliefs in the context of a federally funded program." ' 12
In response to the first possibility, the Court stated that such recog-
nition of the role of religious organizations reflected "at most" nothing
more than the judgment of Congress that religious organizations could
help solve the problems to which the AFLA is addressed, and concluded
that if this Congressional recognition had any effect of advancing reli-
gion, it was "at most 'incidental and remote.' "113 The Court com-
mented that although the AFLA does require potential grantees to
describe how they will involve religious organizations in the provision of
services, it also requires them to describe the involvement of nonreligious
providers, such as "charitable organizations" and "voluntary organiza-
tions." ' 4 The Court interpreted this provision as a reflection of " 'a
course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and non-
religion.' "115
Regarding the second possibility (that in encouraging the participa-
tion of religious groups, the AFLA authorizes the teaching of religion),
the Court claimed that because the AFLA is neutral on its face with
respect to the grantee's status (religious or secular), a fairly wide spec-
trum of organizations is eligible to apply for funding. "[N]othing on the
face of the statute suggests that the AFLA is anything but neutral with
respect to the grantee's status as a sectarian or purely secular institu-
tion."' 16 In addition, the majority asserted that "[t]his Court has never
held that religious institutions are disabled by the First Amendment from
participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs," 117 and re-
ferred to the "long history of cooperation and interdependency between
governments and charitable or religious organizations."'"18 The Court
concluded that a "facially neutral" statute, providing for distribution of
federal funds to a variety of groups, but not specifically directing that
government aid to any "pervasively sectarian" institution, could not have
the effect of advancing religion." 19
111. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2572.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2573 (quoting Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985);
citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 771 (1973)).
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985)).
116. Id. at 2573.
117. Id. at 2574. In support of its argument, the Court cited an 1899 case, Bradfield v.
Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298, which held that using federal funds to construct a building on the
grounds of a religiously affiliated hospital did not violate the Establishment Clause.
118. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2574.
119. Id. at 2575.
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After responding to what it perceived as the two ways the statute
could, on its face, have the effect of advancing religion, and determining
that the Act's "facial neutrality" precluded such an effect, the Court
summarily disposed of the lower court's arguments 20 in support of the
court's holding that the AFLA, on its face, had the primary effect of
advancing religion. 2' The Court refused to consider the district court's
finding that the AFLA was invalid as applied, claiming that the district
court had not followed "the proper approach in assessing appellees'
claim that the Secretary is making grants under the Act that violate the
Establishment Clause .... 122
Finally, the Court stated that since the religious AFLA grantees
were not "pervasively sectarian," they would require only a low level of
monitoring, and the government would thus not have occasion to intrude
unduly into the affairs of the religious organizations receiving grants.123
Consequently, the Court concluded, the AFLA did not create excessive
entanglement betweeen religion and state.124 The Court then remanded
the case to the district court for a consideration of whether the statute, as
applied, violated the Constitution, and for an appropriate remedy in the
event that the lower court found that grants were being made in violation
of the Establishment Clause.' 25
Justice O'Connor wrote a brief concurrence to explain why she did
not believe that the Court's approach reflected tolerance for "the kind of
improper administration that seems to have occurred" in the administra-
tion of the AFLA.126 She emphasized that any use of public funds to
promote religious doctrines would violate the Establishment Clause, but
added that because the lower court had not engaged in a "detailed dis-
cussion of the voluminous record," it was not clear to what extent the
instances of impermissible behavior by AFLA grantees were attributable
to "poor administration by the Executive Branch."'' 27 She concluded
that the appellees might "yet prevail on remand" if they could prove
"extensive violations" of the prohibition against the use of public funds
for religious purposes.' 28
120. See Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at 1562-64.
121. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2575-77.
122. Id. at 2580. The Court complained that, although the lower court had identified cer-
tain instances in which AFLA funds were being used for improper purposes, it did not discuss
with sufficient particularity "the aspects of those organizations which in its view warranted
classification as 'pervasively sectarian' [and] did not adequately design its remedy to address
the specific problems it found in the Secretary's administration of the statute." Id.
123. Id. at 2578.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2581.
126. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Justice Kennedy added a concurring opinion (joined by Justice
Scalia) in which he asserted that the fact that public funds go to perva-
sively sectarian institutions is not sufficient to invalidate a statute that
has been found constitutional on its face.'29 "The question in an as-ap-
plied challenge is not whether the entity is of a religious character, but
how it spends its grant."
' 130
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, asserted that "[t]he
AFLA, without a doubt, endorses religion" and stated that he would find
the statute unconstitutional without remanding it to the district court. 31
Before evaluating the AFLA in light of the three-part test, Blackmun
discussed two areas of the majority's analysis to which he took exception.
He commented that the district court had rightfully felt compelled to
analyze the AFLA both "on its face" and "as applied" because in the
past, the Supreme Court has in some cases ruled on the facial validity of
a statute, and in others has limited its review to the particular applica-
tions at issue.' 32 But, Blackmun claimed, the majority misused the dis-
tinction.'3 3 By dividing the analysis 34 and characterizing the appellees'
attack as a "facial" challenge, "the majority justifie[d] divorcing its anal-
ysis from the extensive record developed in the district court, and
thereby... render[ed] the evaluation of the Lemon effects prong particu-
larly sterile and meaningless."'135
Blackmun then identified what he considered "a particular flaw in
the majority's method," the premise that "the primary means of ascer-
129. Id. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130. Id. The Court apparently rejected this suggestion. "[I]t will be open to appellees on
remand to show that AFLA aid is flowing to grantees that can be considered 'pervasively
sectarian' religious institutions .... " Id. at 2580; see also Justice Blackmun's dissent at 2597
n.16.
131. Id. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2583. The lower court in Kendrick v. Bowen stated:
The precedents take as their form of analysis a consideration of the possible applica-
tions of a particular statute, see, e.g., Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-83 (1973) .... [The court must] then analyze
the statute's actual application, see e.g., id.; Levitt v. Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479-82 (1973), and finally, even if the applica-
tion is the only constitutionally offensive element to which the court has pointed,
strike down the statute on its face. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255
(1977); Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767 (1976).
657 F. Supp. at 1552 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
133. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2583-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. The district court, on the other hand, viewed the "on its face/as applied" analysis as a
unified process. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. "While little else is clear in Estab-
lishment Clause law, it is obvious that the distinction between a challenge to a statute on its
face and as applied has not been clearly delineated." Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at
1552. "[B]ecause Establishment Clause case law has not always neatly demarcated a facial
challenge from a challenge to a law as applied," the court found it necessary to consider both
aspects as part of its constitutional analysis. Id. at 1564.
135. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2584 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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taining whether a statute that appears to be neutral on its face in fact has
the effect of advancing religion is to determine whether the aid is going to
'pervasively sectarian' institutions."'3 6 He argued that the Court had
erred both in "adopting a cramped view of what constitutes a 'perva-
sively sectarian' institution,"'3 v and in suggesting that the absence of a
finding of pervasive sectarianism ends the inquiry into the use that will be
made of direct government aid.'38 Establishment clause cases "do not
require a plaintiff to demonstrate that a government action necessarily
promotes religion, but simply that it creates such a substantial risk."'3 9
Blackmun agreed with the majority that the AFLA had a valid sec-
ular purpose,'4° but stated that it clearly had the effect of advancing reli-
gion.14 ' "Whatever Congress had in mind ... it enacted a statute that
facilitated and, indeed, encouraged the use of public funds for [religious]
instruction, by giving religious groups a central pedagogical and counsel-
ing role without imposing any restraints on the sectarian quality of the
participation."' 42 He contended that the AFLA specifically authorized
the expenditure of funds in ways similar to those previously held uncon-
stitutional, such as direct subsidies to parochial schools for books or
teaching materials when the materials would be selected or designed by
the schools themselves. '43 He also argued that the Court's characteriza-
tion of the religious grantees as "social-welfare services"'" did not elimi-
nate the risk that those grantees would be advancing religion at public
expense when they were "directly engaged in pedagogy, with the express
intent of shaping belief and changing behavior."'1
45
136. Id. at 2585.
137. Id. at 2586. Blackmun suggested that the majority's error originated in its determina-
tion that since the AFLA grantees were not (for the most part) parochial schools, the institu-
tions to which the Court had in the past attached the label of "pervasively sectarian," see,
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the relevant analysis must
therefore be that developed by the Court in the college aid cases, see, Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971). For a discussion of the distinctions the Court has made between parochial
schools and colleges in the context of direct government aid, see generally infra notes 190-202
and accompanying text. Blackmun argued that, based on the lower court record, the AFLA
grantees more closely resembled parochial schools on the continuum of "sectarianism."
Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2586-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2587 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2594 (emphasis in original).
140. Id. at 2587.
141. Id. at 2596.
142. Id. at 2583.
143. Id. at 2588; see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51; Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620-21.
144. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
145. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Blackmun claimed that the impermissible effect of the AFLA was
exacerbated by the lack of any statutory restrictions on the use of the
AFLA funds to promote religion.146 He noted that the Court has, in past
cases, upheld statutes providing direct grants specifically because of di-
rect statutory prohibitions on use of funds for religious purposes' 47 and
argued that this deficiency in the AFLA was all the more remarkable in
the light of the elaborate restrictions on the use of AFLA funds for other
purposes, such as abortion counseling or the provision of contraceptives
and other family planning services. 14' Blackmun also observed that the
AFLA "stands out among similar grant programs, precisely because of
the absence of such restrictions."' 49
As for the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test, Blackmun
noted that despite the disfavor with which some members of the Court
have recently viewed this part of the test,'° it still "remains a part of the
applicable constitutional inquiry."'' He argued that the majority's dis-
missal of the appellees' claim that the religious AFLA grantees were per-
vasively sectarian did not eliminate the need to examine the three
entanglement factors: "(1) the character and purpose of the institutions
benefitted; (2) the nature of the aid; and (3) the nature of the relationship
between the government and the religious organization."' 52
III. Case Analysis
A. The Purpose Test
Under the first prong of the Lemon standard, a court may invalidate
a statute only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose.
5 3
Both the majority and the dissent in Bowen v. Kendrick agreed with the
lower court that the AFLA was motivated "primarily, if not entirely" by
146. Id. at 2591-92; see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
147. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Tilton v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682-83 (1971); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 569
(1980); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774, 780 (1973); Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 760 (1976).
148. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2592 n.13 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
149. Id. at 2594 n. 15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
150. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
151. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2595 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2596 (referring to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 614-15 (1971)).
153. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984); Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2570.
The Court has invalidated only a few statutes solely on the basis of impermissible sectarian
purpose: Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (Arkansas statute that prohibited the
teaching of evolution in public schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Arkansas stat-
ute that mandated the placing of a copy of the Ten Commandments in every public school
classroom); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Alabama statute that provided for daily
period of silence in public school classrooms, to be used for meditation or prayer); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (Louisiana statute that required equal treatment of teaching
of "creation science" whenever the theory of evolution was taught in public schools).
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a valid secular purpose.' 54
The stated goals of the AFLA-to foster alternatives to abortion
and to prevent or delay sexual relations among teenagers' 5 5-are proba-
bly not inherently indicative of an impermissible religious purpose. Nev-
ertheless, Congress' explicit intent to use religious as well as secular
means 15 6 to accomplish the AFLA's secular objectives is, at the very
minimum, constitutionally suspect.
The Court's analysis of Congress' purpose in enacting the AFLA
overlooked the significant question of exactly what role Congress in-
tended religious groups to play in the furtherance of the AFLA's secular
purpose. Neither the majority nor the dissent considered whether the
secular objectives could have been accomplished wholly through secular
means. The AFLA gives money to organizations for the specific objec-
tive of influencing the behavior of teenagers by teaching them to abstain
from sex before marriage, and by counseling them that adoption is better
than abortion. '57 The obvious role of religious organizations (as opposed
to secular social service providers) in that enterprise, as Justice Black-
mun suggested in the dissent, is to employ their authority as religious
groups to inculcate sexual morality.15 Whether this morality is "reli-
gious" or "secular," it is unlikely that religious organizations could or
would provide purely "secular" counseling unconnected to their religious
154. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2751; see supra text accompanying notes 96, 102-
108, 140.
155. S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 20 (1981); see supra notes 79-80 and accom-
panying text.
156. The AFLA states that the problems of adolescent sexual relations "are best ap-
proached through a variety of... services provided to adolescents and their families by other
family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other
groups.. . " 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(8)(B); that "the Federal Government should... emphasize
the provision of support by other family members, religious and charitable organizations, vol-
untary associations, and other groups ... " 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(10)(C); that the demonstra-
tion projects funded under the Act "shall use such methods as will strengthen the capacity of
families to deal with the sexual behavior ... of adolescents and to make use of support systems
such as other family members, friends, religious and charitable organizations, and voluntary
associations," 42 U.S.C. § 300z-2(a); and that an application for a grant under the Act "shall
include a description of how the applicant will ... involve religious and charitable organiza-
tions, voluntary organizations, and other groups .... " 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B).
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z(b)(l) and 300z(b)(2) (1983); see S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., Ist
Sess. 2, 8-10 (1981) ("[T]he teenage pregnancy problem consists of several intertwined aspects:
[among which are] the moral issues of premarital teenage sexual relations, abortion, and illegit-
imate births .... ") Id. at 2.
158. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2590 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Senate com-
mittee report that accompanied the 1984 reauthorization of the AFLA acknowledged the way
this religious authority functions: "[P]rojects which target hispanic and other minority popu-
lations are more accepted by the population if they include sectarian as well as non-sectarian
organizations in the delivery of these services." S. REP. No. 496, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1984).
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world views. 159
The involvement of religious organizations was not necessary to
teach the virtues of sexual abstinence. In fact, Congress did not identify
any legitimate purpose that would not have been fully served by involv-
ing only' secular organizations as AFLA grantees or participants in the
delivery of "prevention services." 160 Indeed, the Senate bill introduced
in December 1987 (after the lower court had found the AFLA unconsti-
tutional) to reauthorize the AFLA amended the Act to strike out the
references to religious groups, while retaining the Act's other essential
provisions.16 1 This shows that it was within the contemplation of the
AFLA's supporters that the Act's secular goals could be achieved with-
out the involvement of religious organizations.
If a government uses religious means to accomplish a secular goal, it
sends out a message of endorsement of the religious vehicle, 162 and im-
plies that nonadherents are outsiders. 163 If, on the other hand, an objec-
159. See infra notes 204-227 and accompanying text; see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S.
Ct. at 2590 n.9, where Justice Blackmun cites statements of AFLA administrators and partici-
pants. For example, one Baptist minister is quoted as stating, "In encouraging premarital
chastity, it would be extremely difficult for a religiously affiliated group not to impart its own
religious values and doctrinal perspectives when teaching a subject that has always been cen-
tral to its religious teachings."
160. It is, of course, generally difficult to ascertain legislators' actual, subjective motives.
See, e.g., Justice Scalia's comments on various hypothetical components of "legislative pur-
pose" in Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct 2573, 2605 (1987). The Court has never explained
exactly where evidence of legislative purpose is to be found, nor has it defined the point at
which a law's religious purpose can be said to overwhelm its secular aims. L. TRIBE, supra
note 24, at 1209. It seems clear, however, that the AFLA's sponsors developed the legislation
in an attempt to remedy what they saw as a lack of moral values in the pregnancy prevention
services available to adolescents through federal programs. See supra notes 2-11 and accompa-
nying text. The Bowen v. Kendrick majority cited the 1981 Senate report, S. REP. No. 161,
97th Cong., 1st Sess., for the proposition that Congress' express purpose in enacting the AFLA
was "to expand the services already authorized by Title VI, to insure the increased participa-
tion of parents in education and support services, to increase the flexibility of the programs,
and to spark the development of new, innovative services"-in the Court's view, all laudable
secular goals. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2571. On the other hand, Professor Vinovskis
argues that the Title VI Adolescent Pregnancy Program, transformed in 1981 into the AFLA
with its "prevention" component, see supra note 75, had little support in the House of Repre-
sentatives until the supporters of the reauthorization of the Title X Family Planning Services
Program realized that the AFLA package could be used as a "bargaining chip" in the fight to
save Title X. M. VINOVSKIS, supra note 76, at 77-83. See also Conferees Vote Teen-age Chas-
tity Program, 1981 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1388 (reporting that Senator Hatch offered to
"give up" the AFLA in return for the elimination of federal funding of family planning).
161. 133 CONG. REC. S18210-12 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1987).
162. "In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether the government's ac-
tual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.'" Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56
(1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
L. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 1285-88.
163. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 123-26 (1982); cf. School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963):
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tive can be accomplished only through sectarian means, then that
objective should be suspect in the eyes of the Court.", Teaching moral-
ity using religious means is not a valid secular use of taxpayers'
money.165
In Wallace v. Jaffree,'66 the Court struck down an Alabama statute
authorizing a one-minute period of silence in all public schools "for med-
itation or voluntary prayer," 167 on the ground that the purpose of the
statute was to endorse religion. At the time that the Alabama legislature
enacted the challenged statute, another statute authorizing a period of
silence "for meditation" had been in effect in the state for three years. 
168
The Court ruled that since Alabama had not identified any secular pur-
pose not fully served by the earlier statute before the enactment of the
second statute, only two conclusions were consistent with the text of the
second statute: "(1) [T]he statute was enacted to convey a message of
state endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was en-
acted for no purpose." 169 The Court refused to consider the possibility
that the statute was enacted with no purpose. 1
70
Similarly, since Congress specified no secular function to be per-
formed by the religious groups in carrying out the "prevention" compo-
nent of the AFLA (other than vague assurances about the need for
strong community support and the "simple recognition" that religious
groups have a role in helping to solve such a complex problem as
preventing adolescent sexual activity),1 7' it is possible to conclude that
the inclusion of religious groups in this section of the statute was in-
tended to convey a message of government endorsement and promotion
of religious values, and that Congress had a highly suspect, if not a
We also held ... in Torcaso v. Watkins [367 U.S. 488 (1961)] ... that a State may
not constitutionally require an applicant for [public office] to swear or affirm that he
believes in God .... The [oath in Torcaso] involved an attempt to employ essentially
religious (albeit non-sectarian) means to achieve a secular goal to which the means
bore no reasonable relationship.... [T]he teaching of both Torcaso and [the Sunday
closing laws cases] is that government may not employ religious means to serve secu-
lar interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstra-
tion that nonreligious means will not suffice.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 265 (Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at 269 n.29 (citing cases illustrating
the principle that when first amendment freedoms are affected, government must employ those
means that will least inhibit the exercise of constitutional liberties).
164. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 699-700; Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at
123-24.
165. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 (rejecting argument that Bible readings in Pennsylvania
public schools would not advance religion, but would simply promote moral values and teach
literature).
166. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
167. Id. at 40 (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
168. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 40.
169. Id. at 58-59.
170. Id. at 59-60 (citing United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290, 298 (1951)).
171. S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1981).
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clearly sectarian, purpose in specifying religious organizations as AFLA
grantees.
B. The Effect Test
Under the second prong of the three-part Lemon test, a statute will
be found invalid if its primary effect is the advancement of religion.' 72
The Court's analysis of the effect prong in Bowen v. Kendrick, while
somewhat confusing in its distinction between facial validity and validity
in application, nevertheless appears to signal a new direction in the use of
the Lemon test. In determining that the AFLA, on its face, did not have
the primary effect of advancing religion, the Court relied solely on a tex-
tual analysis of the statute, and concluded that the AFLA was valid be-
cause, first, it provided for grants to a "wide spectrum" of groups, both
religious and secular, 173 and second, it nowhere indicated that the reli-
gious grantees were to be "pervasively sectarian."174 The Court thus
avoided examining the issue of the risk of impermissible advancement of
religion inherent in the AFLA, with its complete lack of statutory re-
strictions on the use of federal funds to teach religion.175
1. " The Court's "Neutral Provision of Benefits" Argument
In making the argument that the AFLA is facially valid because it
provides for grants to a "wide spectrum"'' 76 of groups, both religious and
secular, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the reasoning he first used in
Mueller v. Allen, 177 in which the Court upheld a Minnesota statute that
allowed a tax deduction to parents of school children for tuition, text-
book, and transportation expenses.
Writing for the Mueller majority, Justice Rehnquist argued that be-
cause the deduction was allowed whether the child attended public or
private school, the statute's "neutral" provision of benefits to a " 'broad
... spectrum of groups,'" religious as well as nonreligious, was "'an
important index of secular effect.' ",178 The Court upheld the challenged
statute as an "attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the
172. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at
2570. One way in which direct government aid will have the effect of advancing religion is
"when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in the religious mission .... " Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743
(1973); see Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985).
173. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2573; see infra text accompanying notes 176-178.
174. "There is no requirement in the Act that grantees be affiliated with any religious de-
nomination .... The services to be provided under the AFLA are not religious in character
." Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2573.
175. See infra notes 228-251 and accompanying text.
176. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2573; see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
177. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
178. Id. at 397 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
BOWEN V KENDRICK
private choices of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial
schools from the neutrally available tax benefits at issue in this case." 179
Despite evidence showing that over ninety-five percent of the taxpayers
eligible for the tuition deduction sent their children to religious
schools, 8 ' Rehnquist claimed that the Court could not consider empiri-
cal evidence on a case-by-case basis. The Court ruled that the statute's
facial neutrality meant that it did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 181
Reliance on the Mueller reasoning is inappropriate, however, in an
analysis of the constitutionality of the AFLA. In Mueller, the financial
benefit flowed from the state to the parents, rather than directly to the
schools. 82 Public funds indirectly benefitted sectarian institutions "only
as a result of numerous private choices of individual parents."' 83 The
AFLA grants, on the other hand, go directly to the grantees; and the
Department of Health and Human Services, not the individual parents,
determines who the grantees will be. Since the grants for the demonstra-
tion projects are limited to two per state, the grant applicants are placed
in the position of competing with one another for the funds. 184 Evidence
suggests that the Department of Health and Human Services was biased
in its selection process toward grant applicants that stressed a "pro-life"
line. 185 By contrast, any Minnesota parent was eligible for the tax deduc-
tion in Mueller; the result was a "neutral" provision of benefits, which
carried with it no "imprimatur of state approval" for the individual sec-
tarian institution.
186
The Bowen v. Kendrick majority claimed that the AFLA reflected
179. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400.
180. Id. at 409.
181. Id. at 401-02. For a more detailed analysis of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Mueller,
see Redlich, Separation of Church and State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1094, 1116-20 (1985); Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 879-86 (1984).
182. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
183. Id.; see Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 490-91
(1986) (Powell, J., concurring):
Mueller makes the answer clear: state programs that are wholly neutral in offering
educational assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate
the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, because any aid to religion results
from the private choices of individual beneficiaries .... [In Mueller], the deduction
was equally available to parents of public school children and parents of children
attending private schools. ... [A]ny benefit to religion resulted from the 'numerous
private choices of individual parents of school-age children.'
184. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and for
Judgment on the Pleadings and Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 38, Kendrick v. Heckler, 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987) (No. 83-
3175) (later Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2562
(1988)).
185. See supra note 88.
186. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
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neutrality between religion and nonreligion' 87 because it required the po-
tential grantees to describe how they would involve "charitable organiza-
tions, voluntary associations, and other groups in the private sector" in
addition to religious organizations. 8 ' This neutrality is cosmetic only.
The AFLA may involve a "broad spectrum" of grantees, but it does not
result in a neutral provision of state assistance to a "broad spectrum of
citizens" ' 9 as did the challenged statute in Mueller.
2. The Court's "Pervasively Sectarian Institutions" Argument
The Court's conclusory assumption that the religious AFLA grant-
ees were not pervasively sectarian underlay its entire analysis of the effect
prong of the Lemon test as applied to the AFLA, and its determination
that the AFLA is a facially neutral, and hence a constitutional,
enactment.
The determination of whether an institution is pervasively sectarian
is important as part of the process of deciding how strictly the use of the
federal or state money must be controlled, but the larger issue is the de-
gree to which a particular statute may contain the potential or risk of
advancing religion. While it is true that in previous cases the Court has
looked sometimes at the language of a challenged statute, and other
times at the manner in which it has been administered in practice, 90 the
standard since Lemon v. Kurtzman has always included a consideration
of whether "the potential for impermissible fostering of religion is pres-
ent."' 91 Indeed, the Court has found that in a pervasively sectarian insti-
tution, a substantial risk of state sponsored religious indoctrination may
exist even in the absence of evidence of specific incidents of impermissible
behavior.'92 Part of the analysis of potential or risk must therefore in-
clude how, if at all, a statute has been put into practice. 193
187. "[N]othing on the face of the Act suggests the AFLA is anything but neutral with
respect to the grantee's status as a sectarian or purely secular institution." Bowen v. Kendrick,
108 S. Ct. at 2573.
188. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B)).
189. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
190. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2569-70.
191. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
192. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 387-89 (1985) (finding an
impermissible risk of inculcating religion in a Michigan program in which classes in secular
subjects for nonpublic school students were financed by the public school system, were taught
by religious-school teachers hired by the public school system to teach the classes in the special
program, and were conducted in religious-school classrooms "leased" by the public schools).
193. Id. at 385 (describing three ways that schools may risk impermissibly advancing reli-
gion: teachers may inculcate particular religious tenets, the funded programs may provide a
symbolic link between church and state, the programs may subsidize the primary religious
mission of the institutions). Many establishment clause decisions have interpreted "effect" to
include the advancement of religion in the application of a statute, and have invalidated stat-
utes that have contained even the possibility of as-applied violations. See Wolman v. Walter,
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The Court had never previously determined that an institution re-
ceiving public funds was, or was not, pervasively sectarian based solely
on the wording of a statute. The distinction between institutions that are
pervasively sectarian and those that are non-pervasively sectarian
originated in a series of cases challenging statutes that provided state or
federal aid to religiously affiliated schools and colleges. In Hunt v. Mc-
Nair,'94 the Court upheld a South Carolina statute that provided financ-
ing for the construction of college facilities, ruling that the statute did not
have a primary effect of advancing religion because a substantial portion
of the college's functions were not subsumed in the religious mission and
because the aid went toward the construction of secular facilities only. 195
In a case decided the same day as Hunt, Committee for Public Edu-
cation v. Nyquist, 96 the Court struck down a New York statute provid-
ing three forms of aid to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.
All three forms of aid were found to have an impermissible effect because
they advanced the religious mission of sectarian schools.197 The Nyquist
Court provided what can be considered a "profile" of a pervasively sec-
tarian school. A school is pervasively sectarian if it does any or all of the
following: imposes religious restrictions on admissions, requires attend-
ance of pupils at religious activities, requires obedience by students to the
doctrines and dogmas of a particular faith, requires students to attend
instruction in theology or religion, is an integral part of the religious mis-
sion of the church sponsoring it, has as a substantial purpose the inculca-
tion of religious values, imposes religious restrictions on faculty
appointments, or imposes religious restrictions on what or how the
faculty may teach.' 98
Three years later, in Roemer v. Board of Public Works,' 99 the Court
applied the Nyquist analysis and held that a Maryland statute that pro-
vided general subsidies to private colleges was constitutional. The Court
considered the "character of the aided institutions," 2" but only in rela-
tion to the question whether there was any danger "that an ostensibly
secular activity ... will actually be infused with religious content or sig-
nificance." '' The Court stated that "[t]o answer the question whether
an institution is so 'pervasively sectarian' that it may receive no state aid
of any kind, it is necessary to paint a general picture of the institution,
433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 620-21.
194. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
195. Id. at 743-44.
196. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
197. Id. at 794.
198, Id. at 767-68.
199. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
200. Id. at 762.
201. Id.
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composed of many elements. '20 2
The Bowen v. Kendrick Court used "pervasively sectarian" in a
much different way than did the Nyquist Court, which, at a minimum,
identified lack of academic freedom as an indicator of a pervasively sec-
tarian institution.20 3 An examination of the record reveals that teachers
in the programs run by certain of the religious AFLA grantees were
trained and controlled by religious authorities, and were forbidden to
teach certain subjects because they were contrary to the grantees' reli-
gious orientation.2°  Teachers in other AFLA programs provided medi-
cally inaccurate information in sex education classes because to do
otherwise would have contradicted the grantees' religious message.20 5
The Bowen v. Kendrick Court ignored this evidence, which had led
the district court to find that the AFLA contemplated the distribution of
federal funds to pervasively sectarian institutions. The Court admitted
that direct monetary aid, even if designated for secular purposes, may
advance the religious mission of a pervasively sectarian institution.20 6
But after citing the "college cases" 2 7 for the proposition that the Court
has, on occasion, found religiously affiliated institutions to be not perva-
sively sectarian, 20 1 the Court declared that even if some of the funds
might wind up in the hands of pervasively sectarian institutions,20 9 "[w]e
202. Id. at 758.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 196-198.
204. For example, under the "Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals,"
approved by the Committee on Doctrine of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, all
Catholic medical facilities must reflect, in their policies and practices, "the moral teachings of
the Church under the guidance of the local bishop." AFLA programs run under the auspicies
of Catholic hospitals were therefore required to abide by these religious guidelines. Bowen v.
Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2591; Joint Appendix at 301-02, 312-15, 526-29 & 540-44 (filed Jan. 12,
1988), Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (Nos. 87-253, 87-431, 87-462) [hereinafter
Jt. App.]. The "Boston Archdiocese Guidelines on Sex Education" state that "sex education
should be based on Catholic teaching." Jt. App at 608-10. Adolescent girls in AFLA pro-
grams affiliated with St. Margaret's Hospital for Women in Dorchester, Massachusetts, were
offered information on "natural family planning," but not on any other form of contraception
-because "it is in conflict with the teachings of the Catholic Church." Id. at 406-07.
205. Adolescents in certain federally funded AFLA programs were taught, for example,
that all methods of contraception except "natural family planning" (i.e., selective abstinence)
had negative medical side effects and were physically harmful, Jt. App., supra note 204, at 343;
that the use of spermicides caused birth defects, such as Down's Syndrome, "limb reduction
malformations," and "malignant neoplasms," id. at 352 & 586; that condoms were not effec-
tive in preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, id. at 538; that there were never
any medical or psychological indications for abortion, id. at 382 & 536-39; that "science has
now proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that human life begins at conception" and that "[t]he
conceptus, from the very beginning, has its own life, is a totally new human being, a new
person .... [A]bortion always takes an innocent, already existing life," id. at 358.
206. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2574.
207. See supra text accompanying note 137.
208. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2573-74.
209. The Court tried to hedge its bet by stating in the same paragraph that "of the eligible
religious institutions, many will not deserve the label of 'pervasively sectarian.'" Bowen v.
do not think the possibility is sufficient to conclude that no grants what-
soever can be given under the statute to religious organizations."' 0
Despite the majority's insistence on identifying the religious AFLA
grantees as mere participants in "publicly sponsored social welfare pro-
grams," '' the religious grantees resembled more closely the "pervasively
sectarian" institutions described in the Court's aid to parochial school
cases, 2 2 such as Nyquist, than they did the religiously affiliated liberal
arts colleges in the so-called "college cases, such as Hunt and Roe-
mer."' 3 The AFLA funds were given directly to religious groups (not
liberal arts colleges) for the specific purpose of teaching adolescents (not
college students) the importance of sexual abstinence (not English or his-
tory or mathematics). Justice Blackmun pointed out the Court's mis-
placed reliance on the "college cases," and argued that
[t]he voluminous record compiled by the parties and reviewed by
the District Court illustrates the manner in which the AFLA has
been interpreted and implemented .... and eliminates whatever
need there might be to speculate about what kind of institutions
might receive funds. There is no basis for ignoring the [record]
simply because the recipients of government funds may not in
Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2574 & n.12. But it should make no difference analytically whether a
small or a large percentage of the AFLA funds go to pervasively sectarian grantees. See Con-
stitutional Law Conference, 57 U.S.L.W. 2224, 2228-29 (1988); see also Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 805 (1973). Chief Justice Rehnquist himself has criticized
"'the unsupportable approach of measuring the "effect" of a law by the percentage of' sectar-
ian organizations benefitted." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 366, 389 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at. 804). In Mueller v. Allen, Rehnquist emphasized that
the question whether a large or small percentage of the beneficiaries is sectarian is irrelevant in
determining the constitutionality of a statute challenged on establishment clause grounds. 463
U.S. 388, 401 (1983).
210. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2574.
211. Id. The Court attempted to analogize the case to Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899), in which the giving of federal money for the construction of a religiously affiliated
hospital was held not to violate the Establishment Clause. "[T]he long history of cooperation
and interdependency between governments and charitable or religious organizations is re-
flected in the legislative history of the AFLA." Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2574. Justice
Blackmun criticized this argument, however, noting that the specific reason for the construc-
tion of the hospital in Bradfield was "the care of such sick and invalid persons as may place
themselves under the treatment and care of the corporation." Id. at 2591 n. 11 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. at 299-300). As Blackmun noted, there is a
significant difference between running a hospital or a soup kitchen and counseling teenagers
"with the express intent of shaping belief and changing behavior." Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S.
Ct. at 2591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212. For example, the district court observed that, based on the record before it, the AFLA
grantees and participants included "organizations with institutional ties to religious denomina-
tions and corporate requirements that the organizations abide by and not contradict religious
doctrines. In addition, other recipients of AFLA funds, while not explicitly affiliated with a
religious denomination, [were] religiously inspired and dedicated to teaching the dogma that
inspired them." Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at 1564.
213. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2586-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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every sense resemble parochial schools.2 14
The Court premised the remainder of its analysis of the district
court's ruling on this conclusion that the AFLA was a facially neutral
statute that contemplated the involvement of only non-pervasively sec-
tarian religious institutions. The Court first discussed the lower court's
findings concerning the ways in which the AFLA, on its face, had the
primary effect of advancing religion because it funded the teaching and
counseling of adolescents by religious organizations on matters related to
religious doctrine. 15 The Court admitted that the Establishment Clause
prohibits "'government financed ... indoctrination in the beliefs of a
particular religious faith,' "216 but then claimed that it has in the past
invalidated statutes on the basis of risk of religious indoctrination only in
the context of aid to pervasively sectarian institutions.217 The Court re-
fused to presume such a risk in a non-pervasively sectarian institution.218
As for the subject matter (the harm of premarital sex and the choosing of
adoption over abortion), the Court stated simply that it was "not surpris-
ing" that the government's secular concerns would "coincide" with those
of certain religions, and asserted that the facially neutral AFLA projects
would not be converted into specifically religious activities by the fact
that they were carried out by religiously affiliated organizations.21 9
As Justice Blackmun noted, however, the record before the Court
was full of evidence showing how the "secular" values promoted by the
AFLA took on a religious nature "when promoted in theological terms
by religious figures. "22 ° For example, a number of the grantees used, as
part of their curricula, explicitly religious materials containing theologi-
214. Id. at 2587 (emphasis in original). Ironically, Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced a similar
complaint in his dissenting opinion in Meek v. Pittenger:
[T]he Court's conclusion.., is apparently no more than an ex cathedra pronounce-
ment.., since the District Court found the facts to be exactly the opposite .... The
propensity of the Court to disregard findings of fact by district courts in Establish-
ment Clause cases... is at variance with the established division of responsibilities
between trial and appellate courts in the federal system. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a).
421 U.S. at 392. And in Roemer v. Board of Public Works, the Court refused to set aside as
"clearly erroneous" the lower court's findings concerning the role of religion in the sectarian
institutions receiving state funding. "It is not our place ... to reapprise the evidence, unless it
plainly fails to support the findings of the trier of facts." 426 U.S. 736, 758 (1976).
215. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at 1562.
216. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2575 (quoting Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
217. Id. at 2576.
218. "[N]othing in our prior cases warrants the presumption adopted by the District Court
that religiously affiliated AFLA grantees are not capable of carrying out their functions under
the AFLA in a lawful secular manner." Id. at 2575-76.
219. Id. at 2576.




cal views on sexual conduct and abortion. 22 1 Other grantees counseled
teenagers in parochial schools and church buildings adorned with reli-
gious symbols. 222 In certain AFLA programs, the sponsoring religious
organization would follow the secular sex education portion, presented
by the AFLA staffer, with a presentation in the same room and in the
staffer's presence, of the organization's religious views on the same sub-
ject matter.223 As a result, many of the participating adolescents believed
that these federally-funded programs were sponsored by the religious de-
nominations that controlled the schools and churches. 224 Yet in the face
of hundreds of pages of uncontroverted facts225 demonstrating what even
the majority was forced to admit was "impermissible behavior by AFLA
grantees,1226 the Court dismissed as inconsequential the risk, that the
grantees would engage in religious indoctrination, just because "some of
the religious institutions who receive AFLA funding.., agree with the
message that Congress intended to deliver to adolescents through the
AFLA.... 227
3. The Lack of Statutory Restrictions on Religious Teaching
An even more serious flaw in the Court's analysis of the effect of the
AFLA appears in its discussion of whether the AFLA's lack of an ex-
press statutory prohibition of religious teaching constituted an endorse-
ment of religion. After "disingenuously" 22 arguing that "we have never
stated that a statutory restriction is constitutionally required, '229 the
221. Id. at 2583 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at 1565-66.
For example, the Catholic-affiliated Family of the Americas Foundation AFLA program was
described by its director (who "report[s] to the Pope regularly, two, three times a year person-
ally and by correspondence, several times more than that," t. App., supra note 204, at 388) as
"in line with the wishes of the Holy Father... [who] wants us to inform the young people of
the truth and to tell them the virtues of chastity and virginity." Id. at 387. The Family of the
Americas program taught "the moral advantages and the moral aspect of Christian sex educa-
tion ... that their body [sic] is a temple of the Holy Spirit." Id. at 388. The same program
counseled on the technique of the Billings Ovulation Method (of "natural family planning"),
which "fosters family life because.., it facilitates the evangelization of homes." Id. at 382-85.
St. Margaret's Family Life Education Program, see supra note 204, presented courses on sexu-
ality and family life, mainly in parochial schools, where the program included the Catholic
Church's teachings on abortion and contraception. it. App., supra note 204, at 414-16 & 465-
67.
222. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2588 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kendrick v. Bowen,
657 F. Supp. at 1565-66; Jt. App., supra note 204, at 298.
223. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at 1566; Jt. App., supra note 204, at 172, 262-64,
267, 270, 568-69.
224. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at 1566.
225. Id. at 1564 n.14. See generally id. at 1564-67.
226. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2580.
227. Id. at 2576.
228. Id. at 2592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 2577 (emphasis in original). But cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619
(1971) ("The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not
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Court ignored ample precedent, 23° and declared that because there was
"no intimation in the statute that ... religious uses are permitted,"' 231
because the 1984 Senate Report on the AFLA states that the use of
AFLA funds to teach religion "'is contrary to the intent of this legisla-
tion,' "232 and because the AFLA provides that the Secretary of Health
and Human Services may require "reports concerning [the grantees'] use
of Federal funds,, 233 the statute, on its face, did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion.234
Even if not pervasively sectarian, a religiously affiliated institution
may receive state aid only if there is adequate assurance that no sectarian
activities will be funded. 235 The Court cannot assume, as did the major-
ity in Bowen v. Kendrick, that because "there is ... no intimation in the
statute that ... religious uses are permitted, '236 the state is not required
to monitor the use of funds given to religious institutions, or conversely,
that the state will automatically do So. 2 37 "[W]here Congress intends to
inculcate religion."); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) ("[Tihe
State is constitutionally compelled to assure that the state-supported activity is not being used
for religious indoctrination.").
230. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2592-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679-83 (1981)); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
659 (1980); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-80; Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. at 621).
231. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577.
232. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 496, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984)). The Court neglected to
mention, however, that Congress expressly cautioned that this report should not be "consid-
ered legislative history for the purpose of interpreting ... the Adolescent Family Life Act."
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1154, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984).
233. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(c)). The only
restriction actually placed on the grants by Health and Human Services consisted of a para-
graph (in the "Notice of Grant Award") that was apparently added only after the litigation
had begun in the district court. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2594 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). The district court observed that this precaution could be considered "neither a statutory
prohibition nor an official administrative regulation" but rather "merely an unpublished ad-
ministrative warning that was written at agency discretion and can be revoked by agency fiat."
Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at 1563 n.13. Blackmun noted that what the majority re-
ferred to as the " 'mechanism whereby the Secretary can policy the grants,'" is of no help
where the statute itself contains no restrictions, and where the Secretary has not promulgated
any. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2594 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting the Court). It
is also useless in dealing with objections (such as those of appellees in Bowen v. Kendrick) that
question the manner in which the grant program was administered and the grantees were
selected. See supra notes 88-90.
234. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577.
235. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 759 (1976).
236. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577.
237. Not only did HHS not effectively monitor the activities of the grantees, see Bowen v.
Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2590 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), but substantial evidence exists that
HHS tacitly approved of the grantees' teaching of religion. Successful applicants for AFLA
funds submitted grant applications that proposed, for example, a sex education program "[i]n
keeping with the Pope's strong guideline," Jt. App., supra note 204, at 576, the promotion of
"a lifestyle based on biblical principles," id. at 572, and "church based character development"
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impose a condition on the grant of federal funds, 'it must do so unam-
biguously.' ,,23 The AFLA's lack of a statutory prohibition against the
teaching of religion is particularly striking considering the great care
Congress took both to restrict the use of AFLA funds to grantees that do
not perform abortions or provide abortion counseling or referral,239 and
to ensure that the parental notification requirement would be rigidly ad-
hered to by the grantees. 24
The lack of statutory restrictions in the AFLA creates a clear poten-
tial for constitutional violations of the kind found by the Court in Com-
mittee for Public Education v. Nyquist 241 and Levitt v. Committee for
Public Education.242 In Nyquist, the Court struck down a New York
statute that provided direct money grants to nonpublic schools to be used
for maintenance and repair of facilities and equipment. The statute was
struck down in part because it did not restrict payments to expenditures
"related to the upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular pur-
poses." '2 43 The Court concluded that, "[a]bsent appropriate restrictions
on expenditures.., it simply cannot be denied that this section has a
primary effect that advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the reli-
gious activities of ... [the] schools." 2 "
In Levitt, the Court held that a New York statute under which the
State reimbursed private schools for costs of state-mandated testing and
recordkeeping was unconstitutional because the weak disclaimer in the
statute245 did not provide an adequate guarantee that the teacher-pre-
pared tests would be free of religious instruction.246 The Court also
found the statute unacceptable because it contained no provision guaran-
teeing that a school's actual costs were the same as the annual lump sum
payment, nor did it contain any provision for the return of money in
to "prevent immoral sexual activity," id. at 563. One organization described its program as
based on work done by a priest on its staff "in developing a value-based sex education model
for the Roman Catholic Church." Id. at 433.
238. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10; see Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2592 n.13 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). While the AFLA grantees were strictly forbidden by the statute to offer any abor-
tion counseling, or even to refer pregnant teenagers to an agency that would provide informa-
tion about abortion, there were no restrictions on presenting any negative theories or
comments about abortion. Many of the AFLA grantees, in fact, taught that abortion was
morally wrong, regardless of the circumstances. See Jt. App., supra note 204, at 382, 536-39.
240. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-5(a)(22)(A), (B), (C) and 300z-5(d)(1).
241. 413 U.S. 765, 774 (1973).
242. 413 U.S. 473, 477 (1973).
243. 413 U.S. at 774.
244. Id.
245. "'Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to authorize the making of any
payment under this act for religious worship or instruction.'" 413 U.S. at 477 (quoting the
challenged legislation).
246. Id. at 480.
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excess of the cost of the mandated testing and recordkeeping z47
By contrast, in Committee for Public Education v. Regan,z48 the
Court upheld legislation that New York had enacted in an attempt to
correct the unconstitutional features of the act struck down in Levitt.
The Regan Court found the challenged statute constitutional specifically
because the tests would be prepared by the state, rather than by the
teachers at the nonpublic schools, and because the statute provided for a
state audit of the funds, "thus ensuring that only the actual costs in-
curred in providing the covered services are reimbursed out of state
funds." '4 9 Similarly, in both Hunt v. McNair25° and Roemer v. Board of
Public Works, z51 the Court emphasized that part of its determination
that the challenged statutes were constitutional was based on the pres-
ence in each of adequate restrictions, limiting the use of the funds to
secular purposes.
Even statutory restrictions may not save some legislation, however.
In cases in which the Court has determined that the institutions receiving
the benefit are pervasively sectarian, where "the teaching process is...
devoted to the inculcation of religious values and belief," ' the Court
has held that even a statutory restriction on the use of the funds may not
be sufficient to prevent the direct advancement of religious activity,
where "an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is
constantly maintained." '53 ,
The Court's previous holdings, therefore, require that there be some
restriction on the teaching of religion in a statute such as the AFLA.
Many of the religious AFLA grantees may be too pervasively sectarian to
be funded, even with a statutory prohibition against religious teaching.
But if the Department of Health and Human Services continues to fund
religious grantees, the problem of entanglement-reflected in the third
prong of the Lemon test-arises.
C. The Entanglement Test
Rather than viewing the examples of "impermissible behavior by
AFLA grantees" '54 cited in the record as proof of the AFLA's potential
for advancing religion, the Court declared the AFLA facially neutral and
remanded the case so that the district court might fashion a remedy. The
247. Id. at 477.
248. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
249. Id. at 652.
250. 413 U.S. 734, 744-45 (1973) (interest-free bond financing for college construction).
251. 426 U.S. 736, 760-61 (1976) (general subsidies to private colleges).
252. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366, (1975).
253. Id. at 371; see also Levitt, 413 U.S. at 480 (teachers under the authority of religious
institutions are likely to prepare examinations "with an eye, unconsciously or otherwise, to
inculcate students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring church").
254. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2580.
result of the Court's ruling will almost certainly be entanglement be-
tween religion and state.
Under the third prong of the three-part Lemon test, a statute will be
held invalid if its application creates excessive entanglement between
church and state.255 The Court has identified two major varieties of en-
tanglement: "administrative" and "political." '256 Administrative entan-
glement refers to the actual physical intermingling of religious authority
with the state that results when the state is required to inspect funded
activities to make certain that none of the public money is being used for
religious purposes.257 Political entanglement results when the state funds
a program that has the potential for causing substantial political divisive-
ness because of its religious content.25 This second branch of entangle-
ment has never been used, independently, as grounds for invalidating a
challenged statute, and was recently limited by the Court to "cases where
direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in
parochial schools." '259
The Court in Bowen v. Kendrick included only a token discussion of
the entanglement prong. This cursory treatment undoubtedly reflects the
unpopularity of the entanglement doctrine as a constitutional determina-
tor among certain members of the Court.26 But as Justice Blackmun
noted, the entanglement analysis "is and remains a part of the applicable
constitutional inquiry." 26'
The Court began its analysis by first disparagingly referring to the
entanglement prong as the "Catch-22 ' 262 provision: that "the very su-
pervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion renders the
statute invalid." 263 The Court next admitted that monitoring of AFLA
255. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674 (1970).
256. Some commentators have isolated as many as five varieties of entanglement. See, e.g.,
L. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 1226-27.
257. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674-75; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688
(1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370 (1975); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412-13
(1985).
258. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-25 (1971). The Nyquist Court expressed its
concern that "assistance of the sort here involved [direct money grants to nonpublic schools]
carries grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over
aid to religion." 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973).
259. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 n.Il (1983).
260. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577-78; see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying
text.
261. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2595 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 613; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674).
262. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2577-78. This is an inappropriate metaphor at best.
"To the extent any metaphor is helpful, I would be more inclined to characterize the Court's
excessive entanglement decisions as concluding that to implement the required monitoring, we
would have to kill the patient to cure what ailed him." Id. at 2595 (Blackmun, J., dissenting.)
263. Id. at 2578.
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grants is necessary to ensure that the money is not spent in a way that
would violate the Establishment Clause,264 but then stated that because
"there is no reason to assume that the religious organizations which may
receive grants are 'pervasively sectarian,' " only a low level of monitoring
would be required, which would not be sufficient to "cause the Govern-
ment to intrude unduly in the day-to-day operation of the religiously af-
filiated AFLA grantees. ' 265
As Justice Blackmun explained, however, the entanglement analysis
involves more than just a quick identification of the institutions benefit-
ted as pervasively sectarian or not pervasively sectarian.266 The Court
must also examine both the nature of the aid (whether a one-time grant,
or a continuing program that would require on-going government in-
volvement), and the ability of the institution and the state to identify and
separate the secular activities or programs from the sectarian functions,
without the necessity of on-site inspections to prevent diversion of funds
to sectarian uses.2 67 More supervision should be required, for example,
when a Catholic social service agency, under the control of the Catholic
archdiocese, uses AFLA funds to teach sex education in parochial
schools and parish programs, 268 than when a religious college receives a
grant of federal funds for building construction. 69
Since, as the majority conceded, the necessary monitoring of the
AFLA will require the Secretary of Health and Human Services and his
or her employees to review the educational materials that a grantee pro-
poses to use, and to visit the AFLA program sites to determine whether
the grantees are following the constitutional and statutory require-
ments,270 the federal government will undoubtedly be engaged in surveil-
lance sufficient to create a degree of administrative entanglement between
church and state271 equivalent to that which the Court has previously
found excessive.272
The Supreme Court's resolution of the constitutional challenge to
the AFLA-to remand to the lower court for a remedy for the "poor
administration by the Executive Branch" 273 is likely to lead to both ad-
ministrative and political entanglement. In order to remedy the constitu-
264. Id. at 2572.
265. Id. at 2578.
266. Id. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
267. Id. (citing Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765 (1976); Tilton v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971)).
268. For an example of such a program, see Jt. App., supra note 204, at 401, 408-09 & 414-
16.
269. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 688; Roemer, 426 U.S. at 761-64.
270. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2578.
271. Id. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
272. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 411-14 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 619 (1971).
273. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2581 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
[3ol. 16:513
BOWEN V KENDRICK
tional abuses caused in part by the Department of Health and Human
Service's failure to adequately monitor the AFLA programs, the Court
may order the federal government not only to review the materials being
used in the AFLA courses, but also to implement safeguards in the
teaching process itself. Government supervision of the one-on-one coun-
seling sessions that are a major feature of many religious AFLA grantees'
sex education and pregnancy counseling programs274 will lead to unprec-
edented involvement of the state in the affairs of religious
organizations.275
Furthermore, case-by-case adjudications2 76 of challenges to the ad-
ministration of the AFLA will inevitably lead to excessive entangle-
ment.2 77 If district court judges are forced to become arbiters of disputes
over whether individual religious groups' teaching of sexual morality
constitutes teaching of religion, or just happens to "coincide with the
approach taken by certain religions, '2 78 the result, as the courts engage
in searching for religious meaning, will be inconsistent adjudications cul-
minating in political divisiveness. "The prospect of church and state liti-
gating about what does or does not have religious meaning touches the
very core of the constitutional guarantee against religious establishment
"279
274. For an example of such a program, see Reauthorization of the Adolescent Family Life
Demonstration Projects Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Family and Human
Services of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-46
(1984).
275. Another potential problem, discussion of which is outside the scope of this Comment,
is the possibility of government interference with the free exercise of religion. As the Court
observed (in a different context) in Corporation of Presiding Bishops v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
336 (1987),
[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it ... to predict
which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a
bright one, and an organization might understandably be concerned that a judge
would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.
276. The AFLA funds "demonstration projects." 42 U.S.C. § 300z-2. The grants are re-
newable annually, for a maximum of five years. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-4(c)(l). Consequently, the
grantees that were engaging in impermissible practices in 1982, when the litigation began, are
no longer eligible for AFLA funding. The Bowen v. Kendrick Court stated that the district
court should "consider on remand whether in particular cases AFLA aid has been used to
fund 'specifically religious activit[ies] in an otherwise substantially secular setting,'" 108 S.
Ct. at 2580 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)); and if the court finds that the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services has wrongfully approved grants to
certain religious organizations, "an appropriate remedy would require the Secretary to with-
draw such approval," id. at 2581. But this "remedy" will be useless in preventing the imper-
missible funding of grantees that are no longer eligible to be funded because they have already
acquired their five years' worth of AFLA funds.
277. Gianella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement,
1971 Sup. CT. REv. 147, 181.
278. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. at 2572.
279. New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977).
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The Court's casual treatment of the entanglement prong suggests
that a majority of its members may no longer consider it a vital part of
establishment clause analysis.280 Until specifically overruled, however,
the test remains part of the applicable standard and the Court further
confuses the law by ignoring the precedential weight of the no-entangle-
ment requirement.
Conclusion
Bowen v. Kendrick represents an abrupt reversal in the development
of establishment clause jurisprudence. Permissible government accom-
modation of religion is no longer limited to state-funded religious Christ-
mas displays, 281 or references to God in public ceremonies, 282 but now
extends to state funding of religious groups for the purpose of instructing
teenagers in morally acceptable sexual behavior. No longer will courts
be allowed to invalidate statutes that carry a significant risk that govern-
ment aid will be used to advance religion, if that aid will be cast across a
broad field that includes secular as well as sectarian recipients.
The decision in Bowen v. Kendrick is significant not so much for its
validation of the AFLA-a small federal program involving a limited
section of the American population283 and relatively insignificant ex-
penditures, at least by present-day federal standardsE8 -- as it is for the
degree to which it has opened the door to increased state involvement in
the funding of parochial education. It is now a very short step from a
program in which the federal government makes direct grants to reli-
gious organizations for the purpose of educating teenagers about moral
issues difficult or impossible to separate from religious doctrine, to a pro-
gram providing reimbursement grants to parochial schools for mainte-
nance, supplies, test preparation, or the hiring of teachers, all of which
the Supreme Court has expressly struck down as unconstitutional in pre-
vious cases.28 5
The Court's departure from precedent in Bowen v. Kendrick appears
to be more a product of the recent change in the composition of the
280. See supra text accompanying notes 260-261; see also The Supreme Court-Leading
Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 220 & n.68 (1988).
281. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
282. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
283. See supra text accompanying note 184.
284. The average annual appropriation for the AFLA in fiscal years 1982-1985 was $13.5
million. Federal Money for Abortion Alternatives... Counseling, Contraception, and Nutrition,
1984 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 466-67 (citing Department of Health and Human Services).
285. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (maintenence); Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (supplies); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977) (test preparation); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 607 (1971) (hiring of teachers).
Court286 than of any logical evolution of establishment clause doctrine.
The Court now contains a majority of Justices that have recorded their
disapproval of decisions in previous religion cases,287 although the Court
has not yet rejected the Lemon test, nor expressly repudiated earlier deci-
sions that have reiterated the significance of the three-part test in estab-
lishment clause jurisprudence. 288 But whatever the reason for the Bowen
v. Kendrick decision, the result is that the Court has transformed the
formerly sturdy effect prong of the Lemon test into an anemic standard
that can be easily circumvented through clever legislative drafting.
The Lemon test is not a holy talisman, but the law that has grown
up around it does represent the accumulation of forty years of attempts
by our highest Court to fashion an adjudicative structure for the most
transcendental of all human endeavors-religion. If a majority of the
Supreme Court are dissatisfied with the Lemon test, then the solution is
to create a new, intellectually defensible standard, rather than ignoring
precedent and whittling away at Lemon until there is no law left at all.
By Alexandra Petrich*
286. See Schwartz, George Bush's Supreme Opportunity, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 2, 1989, at 16
(discussing the impact of the Supreme Court's new conservative majority). Professor Schwartz
refers to this conservative quincunx as the "Rehnquist bloc." Schwartz, The Court Next Term:
Consolidating the New Majority, THE NATION, Oct. 9, 1989, at 380.
287. See supra notes 51-73 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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